#### Taming Delays in Cyber-Physical Systems Towards a Theory of Networked Hybrid Systems

Naijun Zhan, Mingshuai Chen



Online Tutorial · ESWEEK · October 2022

# **Tutorial Speakers**



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Formal Methods · Quantitative Verification · Logic and Programming Theory · Cyber-Physical Systems

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

#### Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)

"[...] cyber-physical systems (CPS) refers to a new generation of systems with integrated computational and physical capabilities that can interact with humans through many new modalities. The ability to interact with, and expand the capabilities of, the physical world through computation, communication, and control is a key enabler for future technology developments."


[Radhakisan Baheti and Helen Gill : CPS. The Impact of Control Technology, 2011]

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

## Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)

An open, interconnected form of embedded systems; many are safety-critical.



Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

## Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)

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Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

## Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)

An open, interconnected form of embedded systems; many are safety-critical.



"How can we provide people with CPS they can bet their lives on?"

- Jeannette M. Wing, former AD for CISE at NSF

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

### Formal Methods



"[...] the challenge of designing embedded systems offers a unique opportunity for reinvigorating computer science. The challenge, and thus the opportunity, spans the spectrum from theoretical foundations to engineering practice. To begin with, we need a mathematical basis for systems modeling and analysis which integrates both computation and physical constraints in a consistent, operative manner [...]"



Joseph Sifakis 2007 Turing Awardee

— Embed. Syst. Design Challenge, invited talk at FM '06

Tom Henzinger President, IST Austria

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

### Formal Methods




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System S

Property  $\Phi$ System S  $\rightarrow$  Verifier YES + proof Property  $\Phi$ System S  $\rightarrow$  Synthesizer



**Aim :** Develop mathematically rigorous techniques for designing safety-critical CPS while pushing the limits of automation as far as possible.

Joseph Sifakis 2007 Turing Awardee

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

### Formal Methods



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Property  $\Phi$ System S Environm. E System S Synthesizer System S Syste

Safety, liveness, termination, cost, efficiency, ... vs. intricacy, delays, randomness, uncertainty, ...

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Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

### Formal Methods




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
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Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

#### A Pearl of Wisdom




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Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

#### A Pearl of Wisdom




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Only relevant to ordinary people's life?

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

## A Pearl of Wisdom




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- Only relevant to ordinary people's life?
- Or to scientists, in particular comp. sci. and control folks, too?

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

## A Pearl of Wisdom



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
- Only relevant to ordinary people's life?
- Or to scientists, in particular comp. sci. and control folks, too?

Remember that Canning briefly controlled Great Britain!

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks


## Hybrid Systems Modeling CPS



Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks


## Hybrid Systems Modeling CPS



Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

# Hybrid Systems Modeling CPS



Crucial question : How do the controller and the plant interact?


Traditional answer : Coupling assumed to be (or at least modeled as) delay-free :

- mode dynamics is covered by the conjunction of individual ODEs;
- switching btw. modes is an immediate reaction to environmental conditions.

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

#### Instantaneous Coupling



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
Following the tradition, the above (rather typical) Simulink model assumes

- delay-free coupling between all components;
- instantaneous feed-through within all functional blocks.

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

#### Instantaneous Coupling



©ETCS-3

Following the tradition, the above (rather typical) Simulink model assumes

- delay-free coupling between all components;
- instantaneous feed-through within all functional blocks.

#### Central questions :

- Is this realistic?
- If not, does it have observable effects on control performance?
- May those effects be detrimental or even harmful?

ormal Verification

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

#### Q1: Is Instantaneous Coupling Realistic?



Formal Verification

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

### Q1: Is Instantaneous Coupling Realistic?



#### We are no better :

As soon as computer scientists enter the scene, serious delays are ahead ...

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Taming Delays in Cyber-Physical Systems

Formal Verification

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

# Q1: Is Instantaneous Coupling Realistic?



Digital control needs **A/D and D/A conversion**, which induces latency in signal forwarding.



Digital **signal processing**, especially in complex sensors like CV, needs **processing time**, adding signal delays.



**Networked control** introduces communication latency into the feedback control loop.



Harvesting, fusing, and forwarding data through **sensor networks** enlarge the communication latency by orders of magnitude.

Formal Verification

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

## Q1 : Is Instantaneous Coupling Realistic? – No.





Harvesting, fusing, and forwarding data through **sensor networks** enlarge the communication latency by orders of magnitude.


Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

# Q1a: Resultant Forms of Delay

Delayed reaction : Reaction to a stimulus is not immediate.

Easy to model in timed/hybrid automata, etc. :



- Thus amenable to the pertinent analysis tools.
- ⇒ Not of interest today.


Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

## Q1a : Resultant Forms of Delay

Delayed reaction : Reaction to a stimulus is not immediate.

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Network delay : Information of different age coexists and is queuing in the network when piped towards target.

- End-to-end latency may exceed sampling intervals etc. by orders of magnitude.
- Not (efficiently) expressible in standard models.
- ⇒ Our theme today : discrete-time pipelined delay.


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[Chen et al. : ATVA '18, Acta Inf. '21], [Bai et al. : HSCC '21, SCM '21];
[Zimmermann : LICS '18, GandALF '17], [Klein & Zimmermann : ICALP '15, CSL '15].
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ormal Verification

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

#### Q2 : Do Delays Have Observable Effects?




Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

## Q2 : Do Delays Have Observable Effects?

Delayed logistic equation [G. Hutchinson, 1948]:

$$\dot{N}(t) = N(t)[1 - N(t - r)]$$




N. Zhan · ISCAS, M. Chen · RWTH Aachen

#### Q2 : Do Delays Have Observable Effects? - Yes, they have.

Delayed logistic equation [G. Hutchinson, 1948]:

$$\dot{N}(t) = N(t)[1 - N(t - r)]$$



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Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

#### Q3 : May the Effects be Harmful?




Figure – A robot escape game in a 4×4 room.

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

### Q3 : May the Effects be Harmful?




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Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

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


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Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

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


Figure – A robot escape game in a 4×4 room.

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No delay :

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

### Q3 : May the Effects be Harmful?




Figure – A robot escape game in a 4×4 room.

#### No delay :

Robot always wins by circling around the obstacle \* at (1,2).

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

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


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1 step delay :

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

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


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Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

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


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#### 2 steps delay :

Formal Verification

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

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


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Formal Verification

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

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


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Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

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


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#### 3 steps delay :

Robot is unwinnable (uncontrollable) anymore.

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

# Q3 : May the Effects be Harmful? – Yes, delays may well annihilate the control performance.




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Motivation	Formal Verification	Controller Synthesis	Concluding Remarks
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#### Consequences

- Delays in feedback control loops are **ubiquitous**.
- They may well invalidate the safety/stability/...certificates obtained by verifying delay-free abstractions of the feedback control systems.

Automatic verification/synthesis methods addressing feedback delays in hybrid systems should therefore abound!

Formal Verification

Controller Synthesis

#### Consequences

- Delays in feedback control loops are **ubiquitous**.
- They may well invalidate the safety/stability/...certificates obtained by verifying delay-free abstractions of the feedback control systems.

#### Automatic verification/synthesis methods addressing feedback delays in hybrid systems should therefore abound ! Surprisingly, they don't :

- 1 M. Peet, S. Lall : Constructing Lyapunov functions for nonlinear DDEs using SDP (NOLCOS '04)
- 2 S. Prajna, A. Jadbabaie : Meth. f. safety verification of time-delay syst. (CDC '05)
- 3 L. Zou, M. Fränzle, N. Zhan, P. N. Mosaad : Autom. verific. of stabil. and safety (CAV'15)
- 4 H. Trinh, P. T. Nam, P. N. Pathirana, H. P. Le : On bwd.s and fwd.s reachable sets bounding for perturbed time-delay systems (Appl. Math. & Comput. 269, '15)
- S Z. Huang, C. Fan, S. Mitra : Bounded invariant verif. for time-delayed nonlinear networked dyn. syst. (NAHS '16)
- 6 P. N. Mosaad, M. Fränzle, B. Xue : Temporal logic verification for DDEs (ICTAC'16)
- 7 M. Chen, M. Fränzle, Y. Li, P. N. Mosaad, N. Zhan : Validat. simul.-based verific. (FM '16)
- 3 B. Xue, P. N. Mosaad, M. Fränzle, M. Chen, Y. Li, N. Zhan : Safe approx. of reach. sets for DDEs (FORMATS '17)
- 9 E. Goubault, S. Putot, L. Sahlman : Approximating flowpipes for DDEs (CAV '18)
- 🔟 M. Chen, M. Fränzle, Y. Li, P. N. Mosaad, N. Zhan : Synthesiz. controllers resilient to delayed interact. (ATVA '18)
- 1 S. Feng, M. Chen, N. Zhan, M. Fränzle, B. Xue : *Taming delays in dyn. syst. : Unbounded verif. of DDEs* (CAV '19)
- 12 M. Chen, M. Fränzle, Y. Li, P. N. Mosaad, N. Zhan : Indecision and delays are the parents of failure. (Acta Inf. '21)
- 13 M. Zimmermann. LICS '18, GandALF '17], [F. Klein & M. Zimmermann. ICALP '15, CSL '15]

(plus a handful of related versions)

Controller Synthesis


Concluding Remarks

#### Overview of the Tutorial



Controller Synthesis

#### Overview of the Tutorial



ormal Verification

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

2

## The Agenda

- 1 Verifying Safety of Delayed Differential Dynamics
- 2 Synthesizing Delay-Resilient Safe Control
- 3 Concluding Remarks

## Verifying Safety of Delayed Differential Dynamics

#### Addressing delayed feedback control in continuous dynamical systems

—Joint work w/ M. Fränzle, Y. Li, S. Feng, P. Mosaad, B. Xue, L. Zou—



Formal Verification

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks


Delayed Differential Dynamics

## Delayed Coupling in Differential Dynamics



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#### Predator-prey dynamics

 Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

**Delayed Differential Dynamics** 

## Delayed Coupling in Differential Dynamics



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Predator-prey dynamics

"Despite [...] very satisfactory state of affairs as far as [ordinary] differential equations are concerned, we are nevertheless forced to turn to the study of more complex equations. Detailed studies of the real world impel us, albeit reluctantly, to take account of the fact that the rate of change of physical systems depends not only on their present state, but also on their past history."

[Richard Bellman and Kenneth L. Cooke, 1963]

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Concluding Remarks

**Delayed Differential Dynamics** 

## Delay Differential Equations (DDEs)

$$\begin{cases} \dot{\mathbf{x}}(t) = \mathbf{f}(\mathbf{x}(t), \mathbf{x}(t-r_1), \dots, \mathbf{x}(t-r_k)), & t \in [0, \infty) \\ \mathbf{x}(t) = \phi(t), & t \in [-r_{\max}, 0] \end{cases}$$

Motivation Formal Verific

Formal Verification

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

**Delayed Differential Dynamics** 

## Delay Differential Equations (DDEs)

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Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

Delayed Differential Dynamics

## Delay Differential Equations (DDEs)

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
The unique *solution* (*trajectory*):  $\boldsymbol{\xi}_{\boldsymbol{\phi}} : [-\boldsymbol{r}_{\max}, \infty) \to \mathbb{R}^{n}$ .

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

**Delayed Differential Dynamics** 

## Why DDEs are Hard(er)



DDEs constitute a model of system dynamics beyond "state snapshots" :

- They feature "functional state" instead of state in the ℝ<sup>n</sup>.
- Thus providing rather infallible, infinite-dimensional memory of the past.


N.B. : More complex transformations may be applied to the initial segment  $f_0$  according to the DDE's right-hand side.  $f_0$  will nevertheless hardly ever vanish from the state space.

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

Delayed Differential Dynamics

#### Why DDEs are Hard(er)



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
Concluding Remarks

**Delayed Differential Dynamics** 

## Safety Verification Problem


Given  $T \in \mathbb{R}$ ,  $\mathcal{X}_0 \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$ ,  $\mathcal{U} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$ , weather

$$\forall \boldsymbol{\phi} \in \{\boldsymbol{\phi} \mid \boldsymbol{\phi}(\boldsymbol{t}) \in \mathcal{X}_0, \forall \boldsymbol{t} \in [-\boldsymbol{r}_{\max}, 0]\}: \quad \left(\bigcup_{\boldsymbol{t} \leq T} \boldsymbol{\xi}_{\boldsymbol{\phi}}(\boldsymbol{t})\right) \cap \mathcal{U} = \emptyset \quad ?$$



System is *T*-safe, if no trajectory enters  $\mathcal{U}$  within  $[-r_{\max}, T]$ ; Unbounded :  $\infty$ -safe.

## Bounded Safety Verification of DDEs



Formal Verification

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

**Bounded Verification** 

#### Simulation-Based Verification Framework




Figure – A finite  $\epsilon$ -cover of the initial set of states.




Figure – An over-approximation of the reachable set by bloating the simulation.

©A. Donzé & O. Maler, 2007

Controller Synthesis


Concluding Remarks

**Bounded Verification** 

# Validated Simulation-Based Verification

#### **1** Do numerical **simulation** on a (sufficiently dense) sample of initial states.

- Z Add (pessimistic) local-error by solving an **optimization** problem.
- **B** "Bloat" the resulting trajectories by **sensitivity analysis**.



⇒ M. Chen, M. Fränzle, Y. Li, P. N. Mosaad, N. Zhan : Validat. simul.-based verific.. FM '16.


Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

**Bounded Verification** 

## Validated Simulation-Based Verification

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
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Concluding Remarks

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**Bounded Verification** 

## Example : Delayed Logistic Equation

[G. Hutchinson, 1948]

 $\dot{N}(t) = N(t)[1 - N(t - r)]$ 

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**Bounded Verification** 

## Example : Delayed Logistic Equation

[G. Hutchinson, 1948]

$$\dot{N}(t) = N(t)[1 - N(t - r)]$$




Figure –  $\mathcal{X}_0 = \mathcal{B}_{0.01}(1.49)$ ,  $\mathbf{r} = 1.3$ ,  $\tau_0 = 0.01$ ,  $\mathbf{T} = 10$ s.

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
Concluding Remarks

**Bounded Verification** 

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


Figure – Over-approximation rigorously proving unsafe, with r = 1.7,  $\mathcal{X}_0 = \mathcal{B}_{0.025}(0.425)$ ,  $\tau_0 = 0.1$ , T = 5s,  $\mathcal{U} = \{N|N > 1.6\}$ .

Formal Verification


Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks


**Bounded Verification** 

## Example : Delayed Logistic Equation


[G. Hutchinson, 1948]




(a) An initial over-approximation of trajectories starting from B<sub>0.225</sub> (1.25). It overlaps with the unsafe set (s. circle). Initial set is consequently split (cf. Figs. 3b, 3c).




(b) All trajectories starting from B<sub>0.125</sub>(1.375) are proven safe within the time bound, as the overapproximation does not intersect with the unsafe set.




(c) Initial state set B<sub>0.125</sub>(1.125) is verified to be safe as well.



(d) B<sub>0.25</sub>(0.75) yields overlap w. unsafe; the ball is partitioned again (Figs. 3e, 3f).



(e) All trajectories originating from B<sub>0.125</sub> (0.875) are provably safe.



(f) All trajectories originating from B<sub>0.125</sub>(0.625) are provably safe as well.

Fig. 3: The logistic system is proven safe through 6 rounds of simulation with base stepsize  $\tau_0 = 0.1$ . Delay r = 1.3, initial state set  $\mathcal{X}_0 = \{N | N \in [0.5, 1.5]\}$ , time bound T = 5s, unsafe set  $\{N | N > 1.6\}$ .

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Bounded Verification

## Example : Delayed Microbial Growth

[S. F. Ellermeyer, 1994]

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**Bounded Verification** 

## Example : Delayed Microbial Growth

[S. F. Ellermeyer, 1994]

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{S}(t) &= 1 - S(t) - f(S(t))x(t) \\ \dot{x}(t) &= e^{-r}f(S(t-r))x(t-r) - x(t) \end{aligned}$$





Figure – The microbial system is proven safe by 17 rounds of simulation with  $\tau_0 = 0.45$ . Here, f(S) = 2eS/(1+S), r = 0.9,  $\mathcal{X}_0 = \mathcal{B}_{0.3}((1; 0.5))$ ,  $\mathcal{U} = \{(S; x)|S + x < 0\}$ , T = 8s.

N. Zhan · ISCAS, M. Chen · RWTH Aachen

## Boundary Propagation-Based Approximation of Reachable Sets


- Impose a homeomorphism by bounding the time-lag through sensitivity analysis.
- Compute an enclosure of the reachable set's **boundary**. 2



B. Xue, P. Mosaad, M. Fränzle, M. Chen, Y. Li, N. Zhan : Safe approx. of reachable sets for DDEs. FORMATS'17.

## Boundary Propagation-Based Approximation of Reachable Sets


- Impose a **homeomorphism** by bounding the time-lag through sensitivity analysis.
- Compute an enclosure of the reachable set's **boundary**.
- **Over- (under-)approximate** the reachable set by incl. (excl.) the enclosure.



⇒ B. Xue, P. Mosaad, M. Fränzle, M. Chen, Y. Li, N. Zhan : Safe approx. of reachable sets for DDEs. FORMATS '17.

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## Unbounded Safety Verification of DDEs



Motivation Formal Verific

Formal Verification

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

Unbounded Verification

# Unbounded Analysis for Simple DDE $\dot{\mathbf{x}}(t) = \mathbf{f}(\mathbf{x}(t-r))$

Main Ingredients

Generate Taylor series for the segment  $x|_{[nr,(n+1)r]}$  by integrating  $f(x)|_{[(n-1)r,nr]}$ .

- Observe of Taylor series grows indefinitely (and rapidly).
- Computationally intractable.
- S Lacking means for analyzing unbounded behaviors.

⇒ L. Zou, M. Fränzle, N. Zhan, P. N. Mosaad : Automatic stability and safety verification for DDEs. CAV '15.

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  - © Tractable (if degree low enough).
  - © Thus permits bounded model checking.
  - Still no immediate means for unbounded analysis.

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  - Still no immediate means for unbounded analysis.
- Extract operator computing next ITS from current one; analyse its properties.
   Unbounded safety and stability analysis become feasible.

⇒ L. Zou, M. Fränzle, N. Zhan, P. N. Mosaad : Automatic stability and safety verification for DDEs. CAV '15.

Controller Synthesis

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#### Analysis of a Linear DDE by Example

Recall the DDE  $\dot{x}(t) = -x(t-1)$  with the initial condition  $x([0,1]) \equiv 1$ .

Controller Synthesis

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Unbounded Verification

#### Analysis of a Linear DDE by Example

Recall the DDE  $\dot{\mathbf{x}}(t) = -\mathbf{x}(t-1)$  with the initial condition  $\mathbf{x}([0,1]) \equiv 1$ .

Segmentwise integration yields

$$\mathbf{x}(\mathbf{n}+\mathbf{t}) = \mathbf{x}(\mathbf{n}) + \int_{\mathbf{n}-1}^{\mathbf{n}-1+\mathbf{t}} - \mathbf{x}(\mathbf{s}) \, \mathrm{d}\mathbf{s}, \quad \mathbf{t} \in [0,1].$$

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■ Rename and shift  $x|_{[n,n+1]}$ , with  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , to  $f_n \colon [0,1] \mapsto \mathbb{R}$  by setting  $f_n(t) \cong x(n+t)$  for  $t \in [0,1]$ :

$$f_n(t) = f_{n-1}(1) + \int_0^t -f_{n-1}(s) \,\mathrm{d}s, \quad t \in [0,1].$$

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*f<sub>n</sub>* is a polynomial of degree *n*, i.e., degree 86,400 after a day, ...
 Intractable beyond the first few steps!

bivation Formal Verification

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Unbounded Verification

### Analysis of a Linear DDE by Example

- Employ interval Taylor series to enclose the segmentwise solutions by Taylor series of fixed degree
  - Fixing degree 2, e.g., yields template  $f_n(t) = a_{n_0} + a_{n_1} * t + a_{n_2} * t^2$ ,
  - interval coefficients *a<sub>ni</sub>* incorporate the approximation error.

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  - interval coefficients *a<sub>ni</sub>* incorporate the approximation error.
- For computing the ITS, we need to obtain the first and second derivatives  $f_{n+1}^{(1)}(t)$  and  $f_{n+1}^{(2)}(t)$  based on  $f_n$ :

$$\begin{split} f_{n+1}^{(1)}(t) &= -f_n(t) = -a_{n0} - a_{n1} * t - a_{n2} * t^2, \\ f_{n+1}^{(2)}(t) &= \frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}t} f_{n+1}^{(1)}(t) = -a_{n1} - 2 * a_{n2} * t. \end{split}$$

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• Using a Lagrange remainder with fresh variable  $\eta_n \in [0, 1]$ , we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} f_{n+1}(t) &= f_n(1) + \frac{f_n^{(1)}(0)}{1!} * t + \frac{f_n^{(2)}(\eta_n)}{2!} * t^2 \\ &= (a_{n0} + a_{n1} + a_{n2}) - a_{n0} * t - \frac{a_{n1} + 2 * a_{n2} * \eta_n}{2} * t^2 \end{aligned}$$

Controller Synthesis

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#### Analysis of a Linear DDE by Example

Substituting  $f_{n+1}(t)$  by its Taylor form  $a_{n+1_0} + a_{n+1_1} * t + a_{n+1_2} * t^2$  and matching coefficients, one obtains a time-variant, parametric linear operator

$$\begin{bmatrix} a_{n+1_0} \\ a_{n+1_1} \\ a_{n+1_2} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 \\ -1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & -\frac{1}{2} & -\eta_n \end{bmatrix} * \begin{bmatrix} a_{n0} \\ a_{n1} \\ a_{n2} \end{bmatrix}$$

which can be made time-invariant by replacing  $\eta_n$  with its interval [0, 1].

 $\odot$  Have thus obtained a **discrete-time** interval-linear system  $\mathbf{a}' = \mathcal{M} \mathbf{a}$ !

Motivation 000000000000000 Formal Verification

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#### Stability of Linear DDEs

Observation : The global solution x to the DDE stabilizes asymptotically if the sequence of segments  $f_n$  converges to 0, iff the coefficients  $A_n$  of the interval Taylor forms converge to 0. Formal Verification

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 $\label{eq:consequence: Consequence: Conseq$ 

#### Theorem (J. Daafouz and J. Bernussou, 2001)

The time-variant system  $\mathbf{x}(n + 1) = T(\boldsymbol{\eta}(n)) * \mathbf{x}(n), T(\boldsymbol{\eta}(n)) = \sum_{i=1}^{q} \boldsymbol{\eta}_{i}(n) * T_{i}$ , with  $\boldsymbol{\eta}_{i}(n) \ge 0, \sum_{i=1}^{q} \boldsymbol{\eta}_{i}(n) = 1$ , is asymptotically/robustly stable iff there exist symmetric positive definite matrices  $S_{i}, S_{j}$  and matrices  $G_{i}$  of appropriate dimensions s.t.

$$\begin{bmatrix} G_i + G_i^{\mathsf{T}} & G_i^{\mathsf{T}} & T_i^{\mathsf{T}} \\ T_i & G_i & S_j \end{bmatrix} > 0$$

for all i = 1, ..., N and j = 1, ..., N. Moreover, the corresponding Lyapunov function is

$$V(\mathbf{x}(n), \boldsymbol{\eta}(n)) = \mathbf{x}(n)^{\mathsf{T}} * (\sum_{i=1}^{q} \boldsymbol{\eta}_{i}(n) * S_{i}^{-1}) * \mathbf{x}(n).$$

Just requires some technicalities to obtain appropriate interval forms for applicability of Rohn's method for solving linear interval inequalities.

Concluding Remarks

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Unbounded Verification

#### Unbounded Safety Verification for Linear DDEs

 ${}^{\odot}$  Verifying **unbounded safety**  $\Box \mathcal{S}$  can be accomplished by

- **1** generating a Lyapunov function  $V(\mathbf{A}, \eta)$  by above method,
- **2** computing a barrier value for the safe set by letting iSAT search for the largest *c* such that  $V(\mathbf{A}(n), \eta(n)) \leq c \land \neg S(f_n(t))$  is unsatisfiable,
- ⇒ existence of such *c* implies that  $V(\mathbf{A}(n), \eta_n) \leq c \rightarrow S(f_n(t))$  holds.

Concluding Remarks

Unbounded Verification

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- **3** calculating a safe bound on the minimum reduction  $d_m$  on the condition  $V(\mathbf{A}(n), \eta(n)) \ge c$ , i.e.

 $d_{m} = \min\{V(\mathbf{A}(n), \eta(n)) - V(\mathbf{A}(n+1), \eta_{n+1}) \mid V(\mathbf{A}(n), \eta_{n}) \ge c\},\$ 

by iSAT optimization.

⇒ Existence of such  $d_m$  implies that after  $k \cong \max\left(\frac{V(A(0),0)-c}{d_m}, \frac{V(A(0),1)-c}{d_m}\right)$  we can be sure to reside inside the safety region S.

Concluding Remarks

Unbounded Verification

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- 4 Pursuing BMC for the first *k* steps, which completes proving unbounded invariance.

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

Unbounded Verification

### Multidimensional Polynomial DDEs

Consider a DDE of the form

 $\dot{\mathbf{x}}(t+r) = \boldsymbol{g}(\mathbf{x}(t)), \ \forall t \in [0, r] \colon \mathbf{x}(t) = \mathbf{p}_0(t),$ 

where  $\boldsymbol{g}$  and  $\mathbf{p}_0(t)$  are vectors of polynomials in  $\mathbb{R}^m[\mathbf{x}]$ .

Concluding Remarks

Unbounded Verification

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where  $\boldsymbol{g}$  and  $\mathbf{p}_0(t)$  are vectors of polynomials in  $\mathbb{R}^m[\mathbf{x}]$ .

■ Generalizing the linear case, the Lie derivatives  $f_{n+1}^{(1)}, f_{n+1}^{(2)}, \ldots, f_{n+1}^{(k)}$  can now be computed *symbolically* as follows :

$$\boldsymbol{f}_{n+1}^{(1)}(\boldsymbol{t}) = \boldsymbol{g}(\boldsymbol{f}_n(\boldsymbol{t})), \quad \boldsymbol{f}_{n+1}^{(2)}(\boldsymbol{t}) = \frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}\boldsymbol{t}}\boldsymbol{f}_{n+1}^{(1)} = \frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}\boldsymbol{t}}\boldsymbol{g}(\boldsymbol{f}_n(\boldsymbol{t})), \dots$$

The corresponding Taylor expansion of  $f_{n+1}(t)$  with degree k is

$$\boldsymbol{f}_{n+1}(t) = \boldsymbol{f}_n(t) + \frac{\boldsymbol{f}_{n+1}^{(1)}(0)}{1!} * t + \dots + \frac{\boldsymbol{f}_{n+1}^{(k-1)}(0)}{(k-1)!} * t^i + \frac{\boldsymbol{f}_{n+1}^{(k)}(\boldsymbol{\eta}_n)}{k!} * t^k,$$

where  $\eta_n$  is a vector ranging over  $[0, r]^m$ .

Formal Verification  **Controller Synthesis** 

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#### **Multidimensional Polynomial DDEs**

Akin to the linear case, the above equation can be rephrased as a time-invariant polynomial interval operator

$$\mathbf{A}(\mathbf{n}+1) = \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{A}(\mathbf{n}), [0, \mathbf{r}]), \tag{(\dagger)}$$

where P this time is a vector of polynomials.

Unbounded Verification

#### Multidimensional Polynomial DDEs

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where P this time is a vector of polynomials.

- © Apply polynomial constraint solving to
  - pursue BMC exactly as before, unwinding relation (†),
  - Find a relaxed Lyapunov function by instantiating a polynomial Lyapunov function template w.r.t. (†), using the method in [S. Ratschan and Z. She, SIAM J. of Control and Optimiz., 2010],
  - compute barrier values for a safe set,
  - ...

Controller Synthesis

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Unbounded Verification

#### Stability of General Linear Dynamics by Spectral Analysis

For linear DDEs :

 $\dot{\mathbf{x}}(t) = A\mathbf{x}(t) + B\mathbf{x}(t-r)$ 

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

Unbounded Verification

#### Stability of General Linear Dynamics by Spectral Analysis

For linear DDEs :

$$\dot{\mathbf{x}}(t) = A\mathbf{x}(t) + B\mathbf{x}(t-r)$$

$$\det\left(\lambda I - A - B \mathrm{e}^{-r\lambda}\right) = 0$$

Controller Synthesis

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For linear DDEs :

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Concluding Remarks


Unbounded Verification

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Concluding Remarks


Unbounded Verification

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**Controller Synthesis** 

**Concluding Remarks** 

**Unbounded Verification** 


#### Stability of General Linear Dynamics by Spectral Analysis

For linear DDEs :

 $\dot{\mathbf{x}}(t) = A\mathbf{x}(t) + B\mathbf{x}(t - r)$ 

The characteristic equation :

$$\det\left(\lambda I - \mathbf{A} - \mathbf{B} \mathrm{e}^{-\mathbf{r}\lambda}\right) = 0$$



Globally exponentially stable if  $\forall \lambda \colon \mathfrak{R}(\lambda) < 0$ , i.e.,

 $\exists \mathbf{K} > 0, \exists \alpha < 0: \| \boldsymbol{\xi}_{\boldsymbol{\phi}}(t) \| \leq \mathbf{K} \| \boldsymbol{\phi} \| e^{\alpha t}, \quad \forall t \geq 0, \forall \boldsymbol{\phi} \in \mathcal{C}_{r}$ 

**Controller Synthesis** 


**Concluding Remarks** 

**Unbounded Verification** 

#### Reduction to Bounded Verification

[PD-Controller, E. Goubault et al., CAV'18]

#### Identify the **rightmost eigenvalue** (and hence $\alpha$ ) and construct K. 1



⇒ S. Feng, M. Chen, N. Zhan, M. Fränzle, B. Xue : Taming delays in dyn. syst. : Unbounded verif. of DDEs. CAV '19.


Formal Verification **Controller Synthesis** Unbounded Verification

**Concluding Remarks** 

#### Reduction to Bounded Verification

[PD-Controller, E. Goubault et al., CAV'18]

- Identify the **rightmost eigenvalue** (and hence  $\alpha$ ) and construct K. 1
- Compute  $T^*$  based on the **exponential estimation** spanned by  $\alpha$  and *K*. 2



⇒ S. Feng, M. Chen, N. Zhan, M. Fränzle, B. Xue : Tamina delays in dyn. syst. : Unbounded verif, of DDEs, CAV'19.


Formal Verification **Controller Synthesis** 

**Unbounded Verification** 

#### Reduction to Bounded Verification

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- **3** Reduce to **bounded verifi.**, i.e.,  $\forall T > T^*$ ,  $\infty$ -safe  $\iff$  *T*-safe.



⇒ S. Feng, M. Chen, N. Zhan, M. Fränzle, B. Xue : Tamina delays in dyn. syst. : Unbounded verif, of DDEs, CAV'19.

Concluding Remarks

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Unbounded Verification

#### Stability of General Nonlinear Dynamics by Linearization

For nonlinear DDEs :

$$\dot{\mathbf{x}}(t) = \boldsymbol{f}(\mathbf{x}(t), \mathbf{x}(t-t))$$

$$= \boldsymbol{A}\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{B}\mathbf{y} + \boldsymbol{g}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}), \text{ with } \boldsymbol{A} = \boldsymbol{f}_{\mathbf{x}}(0, 0), \boldsymbol{B} = \boldsymbol{f}_{\mathbf{y}}(0, 0)$$

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

Unbounded Verification

#### Stability of General Nonlinear Dynamics by Linearization

For nonlinear DDEs :

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The linearization yields

$$\dot{\mathbf{x}}(t) = A\mathbf{x}(t) + B\mathbf{x}(t-r)$$

Motivation Formal Verification 

**Controller Synthesis** 

Concluding Remarks

**Unbounded Verification** 

#### Stability of General Nonlinear Dynamics by Linearization

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The linearization yields

$$\dot{\mathbf{x}}(t) = A\mathbf{x}(t) + B\mathbf{x}(t-r)$$

Locally exponentially stable if  $\forall \lambda \colon \mathfrak{R}(\lambda) < 0$ , i.e.,

 $\exists \delta > 0, \exists K > 0, \exists \alpha < 0; \|\phi\| \le \delta \implies \|\xi_{\phi}(t)\| \le K \|\phi\| e^{\alpha t/2}, \quad \forall t \ge 0$ 

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks


Unbounded Verification

#### **Reduction to Bounded Verification**

[Population Dynamics, G. Hutchinson, 1948]

#### **1** Identify the **rightmost eigenvalue** (and hence $\alpha$ ), then construct *K* and $\delta$ .

- **2** Compute  $T^*$ , as well as T' (by bounded verifiers) s.t.  $\|\Omega\| < \delta$  within T'.
- **3** Reduce to **bounded verifi.**, i.e.,  $orall T > T' + T^*$  ,  $\infty$ -safe  $\iff$  *T*-safe.



$$\begin{split} \delta &= \min\left\{\delta_{\epsilon}, \delta_{\epsilon} / \left(\hat{k} \mathrm{e}^{-r\alpha} \left(1 + \|\boldsymbol{B}\| \int_{0}^{t} \mathrm{e}^{-\alpha\tau} \, \mathrm{d}\tau\right)\right)\right\}\\ \delta_{\epsilon} &= \hat{k} \mathrm{e}^{-r\alpha} \left(1 + \|\boldsymbol{B}\| \int_{0}^{t} \mathrm{e}^{-\alpha\tau} \, \mathrm{d}\tau\right) \|\boldsymbol{\phi}\| \, \mathrm{e}^{\epsilon \hat{K} \mathrm{e}^{-r\alpha} t + \alpha t}\\ \epsilon &\leq -\alpha / (2\hat{k} \mathrm{e}^{-r\alpha}) \end{split}$$

⇒ S. Feng, M. Chen, N. Zhan, M. Fränzle, B. Xue : Taming delays in dyn. syst. : Unbounded verif. of DDEs. CAV '19.

Controller Synthesis


Concluding Remarks

# Reduction to Bounded Verification

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
Formal Verification **Controller Synthesis** Unbounded Verification

**Concluding Remarks** 

#### Reduction to Bounded Verification

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⇒ S. Feng, M. Chen, N. Zhan, M. Fränzle, B. Xue : Tamina delays in dvn. syst. : Unbounded verif. of DDEs. CAV '19.

Controller Synthesis


Concluding Remarks

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Unbounded Verification

#### Non-Polynomial Dynamics : Disease Pathology

[M. C. Mackey and L. Glass, 1977]




#mature blood cells in circulation delay btw. cell production and maturation

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nhounded Verification		

Concluding Remarks

### Non-Polynomial Dynamics : Disease Pathology

[M. C. Mackey and L. Glass, 1977]



#mature blood cells in circulation delay btw. cell production and maturation

Parameters:  $\theta = n = 1, \beta = 0.5, \gamma = 0.6, r = 0.5.$ 


 $\infty$ -safety configuration :  $\mathcal{X}_0 = [0, 0.2], \mathcal{U} = \{ p \mid |p| > 0.3 \}.$ 

lotivation	Formal Verification	C
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nbounded Verification		

**Concluding Remarks** 

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Linearization yields

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
Critical values :  $\alpha = -0.07$ , K = 1.75081,  $\delta = 0.0163426$ ,  $T^* = 0$ .

lotivation	Formal Verification	
	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	
nhounded Verification		

**Concluding Remarks** 

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By bounded verification [E. Goubault et al., CAV '18], with Taylor models of the order 5:


 $\| \Omega \|_{[25,45,25,95]} \| < \delta$  and  $\Omega \|_{[-0,5,25,95+0]} \cap \mathcal{U} = \emptyset$ .

lotivation	Formal Verification	
	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	
nhounded Verification		

**Concluding Remarks** 

# Non-Polynomial Dynamics : Disease Pathology

[M. C. Mackey and L. Glass, 1977]



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# 1

Unbounded Verification

# Comparison with Existing Methods for Unbounded Verification

- Allow immediate feedback, i.e, x(t), as well as multiple delays in the dynamics, to which the technique in [L. Zou et al., CAV '15] does not generalize immediately.
- © No polynomial template needs to be specified, yet necessarily for the *interval Taylor models* in [L. Zou et al., CAV'15] and [P. N. Mosaad et al., ICTAC'16], for Lyapunov functionals in [M. Peet and S. Lall, NOLCOS'04], or for barrier certificates in [S. Prajna and A. Jadbabaie, CDC'05].
- © Delay-dependent stability certificate, other than the *absolute stability* exploited in [M. Peet and S. Lall, NOLCOS'04], i.e., a criterion requiring stability for arbitrarily large delays.
- © Confined to differential dynamics featuring exponential stability. Investigation of more permissive forms of stability, e.g., asymptotical stability, that may admit a similar reduction-based idea, is subject to future work.

# Synthesizing Safe Control Resilient to Delayed Interaction

# Staying safe and reaching an objective when observation & actuation are confined by delays

—Joint work w/ M. Fränzle, Y. Li, P. Mosaad, Y. Bai, T. Gan, L. Jiao, B. Xia, B. Xue—




ormal Verification

Controller Synthesis O●○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ Concluding Remarks

# Staying Safe

When Observation & Actuation Suffer from Serious Delays



©ESA

- You could move slowly. (Well, can you?)
- You could trust autonomy.
- Or you have to anticipate and issue actions early.

Delayed Safety Games

# Synthesizing Delay-Resilient Control in Safety Games

2.2 Delay Hybrid Automata \_\_\_\_\_\_ Fixed-Point Comput. → Invariant Generation Global Invariants → Safe Switching Logic


Formal Verification

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

Delayed Safety Games

# A Trivial Safety Game



Goal : Avoid es by appropriate actions of player c.


Formal Verification

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

Delayed Safety Games

# A Trivial Safety Game



Goal: Avoid es by appropriate actions of player c.

Strategy: May always play a except in  $c_3$ :


 $c_1, c_2 \mapsto a \\ c_3 \mapsto b$ 

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

Delayed Safety Games

# A Trivial Safety Game



Goal: Avoid es by appropriate actions of player c.

Strategy: May always play *a* except in *c*<sub>3</sub>:

 $c_1, c_2 \mapsto a \\ c_3 \mapsto b$ 


Properties : Determinacy and memoryless.

 Motivation
 Formal Verification
 Controller Synthesis
 Controler Synthesis
 Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks


#### Delayed Safety Games

# Playing Safety Games under Discrete Delay



#### Delayed Safety Games

### Playing Safety Games under Discrete Delay



Observation : It doesn't make an observable difference for the joint dynamics whether delay occurs in *perception, actuation*, or *both*.


N. Zhan · ISCAS, M. Chen · RWTH Aachen

Taming Delays in Cyber-Physical Systems

<sup>1.</sup> In fact, two different ones: To mimic opacity of the shift registers, delay has to be moved to actuation/sensing for ego/adversary, resp. The two thus play different games!

#### Delayed Safety Games

### Playing Safety Games under Discrete Delay



Observation : It doesn't make an observable difference for the joint dynamics whether delay occurs in *perception*, *actuation*, or *both*.

#### **Consequence :** An obvious *reduction* to a safety game of *perfect information*.

N. Zhan · ISCAS, M. Chen · RWTH Aachen

Taming Delays in Cyber-Physical Systems


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Motivation	Formal Verification	Controller Synthesis	Conclue
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Delayed Safety Games

# **Reduction to Delay-Free Games**

from Ego-Player Perspective




Motivation	Formal Verification	Controller Synthesis	Concluding Ren
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**Delayed Safety Games** 

### **Reduction to Delay-Free Games**

from Ego-Player Perspective



- © Safety games under delay can be solved algorithmically.
- © Game graph incurs blow-up by factor |Alphabet(ego)|<sup>delay</sup>.

Formal Verification


Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

Delayed Safety Games

# The Simple Safety Game

... but with Delay



#### No delay :

$$c_1, c_2 \mapsto a$$
  
 $c_3 \mapsto b$ 

Formal Verification


Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

Delayed Safety Games

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#### No delay :

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#### 1 step delay :

$$e_1, e_5 \mapsto a$$
  
 $e_2, e_4 \mapsto b$ 


Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

Delayed Safety Games

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 $e_2, e_4 \mapsto b$ 

#### 2 steps delay :

$$c_1 \mapsto \begin{cases} a & \text{if } 2 \text{ steps back} \\ an \ a \text{ was issued}, \\ b & \text{if } 2 \text{ steps back} \\ a \ b \text{ was issued}. \end{cases}$$

$$c_2 \mapsto b$$

$$c_3 \mapsto a$$

#### Need memory!

Motivation 0000000000000000	Formal Verification	Controller Synthesis	Concluding Rema
Delayed Safety Games			

# Incremental Synthesis in a Nutshell

Observation : A winning strategy for delay k' > k can always be utilized for a safe win under delay k.

Consequence : A position is winning for delay k is a necessary condition for it being winning under delay k' > k.

M. Chen, M. Fränzle, Y. Li, P. N. Mosaad, N. Zhan : What's to come is still unsure : Synthesizing controllers resilient to delayed interaction. ATVA '18. [Distinguished Paper Award]. arks

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

Delayed Safety Games

# Incremental Synthesis in a Nutshell

Observation : A winning strategy for delay k' > k can always be utilized for a safe win under delay k.

Consequence : A position is winning for delay k is a necessary condition for it being winning under delay k' > k.

# Idea : Incrementally filter out loss states & incrementally synthesize winning strategy for the remaining :

- synthesize winning strategy for the *delay-free* counterpart;
- for each winning state, *lift strategy from delay k to k* + 1;
- remove states where this does not succeed;
- repeat from 2 until either delay-resilience suffices (winning) or initial state turns lossy (losing).

M. Chen, M. Fränzle, Y. Li, P. N. Mosaad, N. Zhan : What's to come is still unsure : Synthesizing controllers resilient to delayed interaction. ATVA '18. [Distinguished Paper Award].

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

**Delayed Safety Games** 

# Incremental Synthesis in a Nutshell

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Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

**Delayed Safety Games** 

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    - **1** synthesize winning strategy for the *delay-free* counterpart;
    - **2** for each winning state, *lift strategy from delay k to* k + 1;
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Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

**Delayed Safety Games** 

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- Observation : A winning strategy for delay k' > k can always be utilized for a safe win under delay k.
- Consequence : A position is winning for delay k is a necessary condition for it being winning under delay k' > k.
  - Idea : Incrementally filter out loss states & incrementally synthesize winning strategy for the remaining :
    - synthesize winning strategy for the *delay-free* counterpart;
    - **2** for each winning state, *lift strategy from delay k to k* + 1;
    - 3 remove states where this does not succeed;
    - repeat from 2 until either delay-resilience suffices (winning) or initial state turns lossy (losing).
- M. Chen, M. Fränzle, Y. Li, P. N. Mosaad, N. Zhan : What's to come is still unsure : Synthesizing controllers resilient to delayed interaction. ATVA '18. [Distinguished Paper Award].

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

Delayed Safety Games

# Incremental Synthesis in a Nutshell

- Observation : A winning strategy for delay k' > k can always be utilized for a safe win under delay k.
- Consequence : A position is winning for delay k is a necessary condition for it being winning under delay k' > k.
  - Idea : Incrementally filter out loss states & incrementally synthesize winning strategy for the remaining :
    - synthesize winning strategy for the *delay-free* counterpart;
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    - remove states where this does not succeed;
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M. Chen, M. Fränzle, Y. Li, P. N. Mosaad, N. Zhan : What's to come is still unsure : Synthesizing controllers resilient to delayed interaction. ATVA '18. [Distinguished Paper Award].

Motivation	Formal Verification	Controller Synthesis	Concluding Remarks
		000000000000000000000000000000000000000	

#### Delayed Safety Games

# Incremental Synthesis of Delay-Tolerant Strategies

**1** Generate a maximally permissive strategy for delay k = 0.


 Second control contro control contro control control control control control control co

Delayed Safety Games

### Incremental Synthesis of Delay-Tolerant Strategies

- **1** Generate a *maximally permissive* strategy for delay k = 0.
- 2 Advance to delay k + 1:

If k odd : For each (ego-)winning adversarial state define strategy as




... and eliminate any dead ends by bwd. traversal.

Delayed Safety Games

### Incremental Synthesis of Delay-Tolerant Strategies


- **1** Generate a *maximally permissive* strategy for delay k = 0.
- 2 Advance to delay k + 1:

If k odd : For each (ego-)winning adversarial state define strategy as



... and eliminate any dead ends by bwd. traversal.

If k even : For each winning ego state define strategy as




Delayed Safety Games

### Incremental Synthesis of Delay-Tolerant Strategies


- **1** Generate a *maximally permissive* strategy for delay k = 0.
- 2 Advance to delay k + 1:

If k odd : For each (ego-)winning adversarial state define strategy as



... and eliminate any dead ends by bwd. traversal.

If k even : For each winning ego state define strategy as



3 Repeat from 2 until either delay-resilience suffices or initial state turns lossy.

Concluding Remarks

Delayed Safety Games

# Incremental- vs. Reduction-Based Synthesis

Ben	chmai	'k		R	eduction	on + Expl	icit-State	e Synthesi	s	Incremental Explicit-State Synthesis						
name	S	$  \rightarrow  $	$ \mathcal{U} $	$\delta_{\max}$	$\delta = 0$	$\delta = 1$	$\delta = 2$	$\delta = 3$	$\delta = 4$	$\delta_{\max}$	$\delta = 0$	$\delta = 1$	$\delta = 2$	$\delta = 3$	$\delta = 4$	%
Exmp.trv1	14	20	4	$\geq 22$	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	$\geq 30$	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	
Exmp.trv2	14	22	4	= 2	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02	_	= 2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	_	81.97
Escp.4×4	224	738	16	= 2	0.08	11.66	11.73	1059.23	_	= 2	0.08	0.13	0.22	0.25	_	99.02
Escp.4×5	360	1326	20	= 2	0.18	34.09	33.80	3084.58	_	= 2	0.18	0.27	0.46	0.63	_	99.02
Escp.5×5	598	2301	26	$\geq 2$	0.46	96.24	97.10	?	?	= 2	0.46	0.68	1.16	1.71	_	98.98
Escp.5×6	840	3516	30	$\geq 2$	1.01	217.63	216.83	?	?	= 2	1.00	1.42	2.40	4.30	_	99.00
Escp.6×6	1224	5424	36	$\geq 2$	2.13	516.92	511.41	?	?	= 2	2.06	2.90	5.12	10.30	_	98.97
Escp.7×7	2350	11097	50	$\geq 2$	7.81	2167.86	2183.01	?	?	= 2	7.71	10.67	19.04	52.47	_	98.99
Escp.7×8	3024	14820	56	$\geq 0$	13.07	?	?	?	?	= 2	13.44	18.25	32.69	108.60	-	99.01
Benchman	'k	R	educti	ion + Yo	sys + S	afetySyn	th (symb	olic)	Incremental Synthesis (explicit-state implementation)							on)
name	$\delta_{\text{max}}$	$\delta = 0$	$\delta =$	$1 \delta =$	$2 \delta =$	$3 \delta = 4$	$\delta =$	$5 \delta = 6$	$\delta = 0$	$\delta = 1$	$\delta = 2$	$\delta = 3$	$\delta = 4$	$\delta = 5$	$\delta = 6$	%
Stub.4×4	= 2	1.07	1.	24 1.2	4 1.	80 -	-		0.04	0.07	0.12	0.18	-	-	-	98.98
Stub.4×5	= 2	1.16	51.	49 1.4	9 2.	83 -	-		0.08	0.14	0.25	0.44	-	-	_	98.97
Stub.5×5	= 2	1.19	2.	61 2.5	0 13.	67 -	-		0.21	0.37	0.63	1.17	-	-	-	98.97
Stub.5×6	= 2	1.18	3 2.	60 2.5	9 23.	30 -	-		0.42	0.69	1.20	2.49	-	-	-	98.96
Stub.6×6	= 4	1.17	2.	76 2.7	4 19.	96 19.69	655.2	4 –	0.93	1.47	2.60	5.79	7.54	7.60	_	99.89
Stub.7 $\times$ 7	= 4	1.23	3 2.	50 2.4	8 24.	57 <b>23.0</b> 1	2224.6	2 –	3.60	5.52	10.08	22.75	31.18	32.98	-	99.88

Concluding Remarks

Delayed Safety Games

# Incremental- vs. Reduction-Based Synthesis

Ben	chmai	rk		]	Reductio	on + Expl	icit-State	Synthesi	s	Incremental Explicit-State Synthesis						
name	S	$  \rightarrow  $	$ \mathcal{U} $	$\delta_{\max}$	$\delta = 0$	$\delta = 1$	$\delta = 2$	$\delta = 3$	$\delta = 4$	$\delta_{\max}$	$\delta = 0$	$\delta = 1$	$\delta = 2$	$\delta = 3$	$\delta = 4$	%
Exmp.trv1	14	20	4	$\geq 22$	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	$\geq 30$	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	
Exmp.trv2	14	22	4	= 2	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02	-	= 2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	-	81.97
Escp.4×4	224	738	16	= 2	0.08	11.66	11.73	1059.23	-	= 2	0.08	0.13	0.22	0.25	_	99.02
Escp.4×5	360	1326	20	= 2	0.18	34.09	33.80	3084.58	-	= 2	0.18	0.27	0.46	0.63	_	99.02
Escp.5×5	598	2301	26	$\geq 2$	0.46	96.24	97.10	?	?	= 2	0.46	0.68	1.16	1.71	_	98.98
Escp.5×6	840	3516	30	$\geq 2$	1.01	217.63	216.83	?	?	= 2	1.00	1.42	2.40	4.30	-	99.00
Escp.6×6	1224	5424	36	$\geq 2$	2.13	516.92	511.41	?	?	= 2	2.06	2.90	5.12	10.30	-	98.97
Escp.7×7	2350	11097	50	$\geq 2$	7.81	2167.86	2183.01	?	?	= 2	7.71	10.67	19.04	52.47	-	98.99
Escp.7×8	3024	14820	56	$\geq 0$	13.07	?	?	?	?	= 2	13.44	18.25	32.69	108.60	-	99.01
Benchman	'k	R	educti	ion + Yo	osys + S	afetySynt	h (symb	olic)	In	crementa	l Synthe	esis (exp	licit-sta	ate imple	mentati	on)
name	$\delta_{\text{max}}$	$\delta = 0$	$\delta =$	$1 \delta =$	$2 \delta =$	$3 \delta = 4$	$\delta =$	$5 \delta = 6$	$\delta =$	$0 \delta = 1$	$\delta = 2$	$\delta = 3$	$\delta = 4$	$\delta = 5 \delta$	$\delta = 6$	%
Stub.4×4	= 2	1.03	71.	24 1.	24 1.	80 -			0.04	0.07	0.12	0.18	_	-	_	98.98
Stub.4×5	= 2	1.16	51.	49 1.	49 2.	83 -			0.08	0.14	0.25	0.44	-	-	_	98.97
Stub.5×5	= 2	1.19	2.	61 2.	50 13.	67 -			0.21	0.37	0.63	1.17	-	-	-	98.97
Stub.5×6	= 2	1.18			59 23.	30 -			0.42		1.20	2.49	-	-	-	98.96
Stub.6×6	= 4	1.17	7 2.	76 2.	74 19.	96 19.69	655.2	4 –	0.93	1.47	2.60	5.79	7.54	7.60	-	99.89
Stub.7×7	= 4	1.23	32.	50 2.	48 24.	57 23.01	2224.6	2 –	3.60	5.52	10.08	22.75	31.18	32.98	-	99.88

0.63

0.69 1.20 2.49

5.52

1.17

10.08 22.75 31.18 32.98

0.21 0.37

0.93 1.47 2.60 5.79 7.54 7.60

3.60

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- 0.42

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Concluding Remarks

Delayed Safety Games

### Incremental- vs. Reduction-Based Synthesis

2.50 13.67

23.30

2.74 19.96 19.69 655.24

2.48 24.57 23.01 2224.62

Bench	nmark			Reduction + Explicit-State Synthesis							Incremental Explicit-State Synthesis					
name	S	$  \rightarrow  $	$ \mathcal{U} $	$\delta_{\max}$	$\delta = 0$	$\delta = 1$	$\delta = 2$	$\delta = 3$	$\delta = 4$	$\delta_{\rm max}$	$\delta = 0$	$\delta = 1$	$\delta = 2$	$\delta = 3$	$\delta = 4$	%
Exmp.trv1	14	20	4	> 22	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	> 30	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	
Exmp.trv2	14	22	4	= 2	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02	-	= 2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	-	81.97
Escp.4×4	224	738	16	= 2	0.08	11.66	11.73	1059.23	-	= 2	0.08	0.13	0.22	0.25	-	99.02
Escp.4×5	360	1326	20	= 2	0.18	34.09	33.80	3084.58	-	= 2	0.18	0.27	0.46	0.63	-	99.02
Escp.5×5	598	2301	26	$\geq 2$	0.46	96.24	97.10	?	?	= 2	0.46	0.68	1.16	1.71	-	98.98
Escp.5×6 8	840	3516	30	$\geq 2$	1.01	217.63	216.83	?	?	= 2	1.00	1.42	2.40	4.30	-	99.00
Escp.6×6 12	224	5424	36	$\geq 2$	2.13	516.92	511.41	?	?	= 2	2.06	2.90	5.12	10.30	-	98.97
Escp.7×7 23	350 1	1097	50	$\geq 2$	7.81	2167.86	2183.01	?	?	= 2	7.71	10.67	19.04	52.47	-	98.99
Escp.7×8 30	024 1	4820	56	$\ge 0$	13.07	?	?	?	?	= 2	13.44	18.25	32.69	108.60	-	99.01
Benchmark	[	R	educt	ion + Yo	osys + S	afetySyn	th (symb	olic)	Incremental Synthesis (explicit-state implementation)							on)
name $\delta_n$	nax	$\delta = 0$	δ =	$1 \delta =$	$2 \delta =$	$3 \delta = 4$	$\delta = \delta$	$5 \delta = 6$	$\delta = 0$	$0 \delta = 1$	$\delta = 2$	$\delta = 3$	$\delta = 4$	$\delta = 5 \delta$	$\delta = 6$	%
Stub. $4 \times 4 =$	= 2	1.07	1.	24 1.3	24 1.	80 -			0.04	0.07	0.12	0.18	-	-	_	98.98
Stub.4×5 =	= 2	1.16	5 1.	.49 1.4	49 2.	83 -			0.08	0.14	0.25	0.44	-	-	_	98.97

Stub.5×5 = 2

Stub.5×6 = 2

Stub. $6 \times 6 = 4$ 

Stub.7×7 = 4

1.19 2.61

1.18

1.17 2.76

1.23 2.50

2.60 2.59

98.97

98.96

99.89

99.88

ormal Verification

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

Delayed Safety Games

# Incremental- vs. Reduction-Based Synthesis


Benchmark Reduction + Explicit-State Sy									3	Incremental Explicit-State Synthesis						
name	S	$  \rightarrow  $	$ \mathcal{U} $	$\delta_{\max}$	$\delta = 0$	$\delta = 1$	$\delta = 2$	$\delta = 3$	$\delta = 4$	$\delta_{\max}$	$\delta = 0$	$\delta = 1$	$\delta = 2$	$\delta = 3$	$\delta = 4$	%
Exmp.trv1	14	20	4	$\geq 22$	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	$\geq 30$	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	
Exmp.trv2	14	22	4	= 2	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02	-	= 2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	_	81.97
Escp.4×4	224	738	16	= 2	0.08	11.66	11.73	1059.23	-	= 2	0.08	0.13	0.22	0.25	-	99.02
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Escp.5×5	598	2301	26	$\geq 2$	0.46	96.24	97.10	?	?	= 2	0.46	0.68	1.16	1.71	-	98.98
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Escp.6×6 1	224	5424	36	$\geq 2$	2.13	516.92	511.41	?	?	= 2	2.06	2.90	5.12	10.30	-	98.97
Escp.7×7 2	350	11097	50	$\geq 2$	7.81	2167.86	2183.01	?	?	= 2	7.71	10.67	19.04	52.47	-	98.99
Escp.7×8 3	024	14820	56	$\geq 0$	13.07	?	?	?	?	= 2	13.44	18.25	32.69	108.60	-	99.01
Benchmark		R	educti	ion + Yo	osys + S	afetySynt	h (symb	olic)	Inc	rementa	ıl Synthe	sis (exp	olicit-sta	ate imple	mentati	on)
name $\delta_r$	nax	$\delta = 0$	$\delta =$	$1 \delta =$	$2 \delta =$	$3 \delta = 4$	$\delta = \delta$	$5 \delta = 6$	$\delta = 0$	$\delta = 1$	$\delta = 2$	$\delta = 3$	$\delta = 4$	$\delta = 5$	$\delta = 6$	%
Stub.4×4 =	= 2	1.07	1.	24 1.	24 1.	80 -			0.04	0.07	0.12	0.18	-	_	_	98.98
$Stub.4 \times 5 =$	= 2	1.16	5 1.	49 1.	49 2.	- 83			0.08	0.14	0.25	0.44	-	-	_	98.97
Stub.5×5 =	= 2	1.19	2.	61 2.	50 13.	57 -			0.21	0.37		1.17	-	-	-	98.97
$Stub.5 \times 6 =$	= 2	1.18			59 23.	30 -			0.42	0.69	1.20	2.49	-	-	-	98.96
Stub.6×6 =	= 4	1.17	2.	76 2.	74 19.	96 19.69	655.2	4 –	0.93	1.47	2.60	5.79	7.54	7.60	-	99.89
$Stub.7 \times 7 =$	= 4	1.23	3 2.	50 2.	<b>48</b> 24.:	57 <b>23.01</b>	2224.6	2 –	3.60	5.52	10.08	22.75	31.18	32.98	-	99.88

**Controller** Synthesis 

Delayed Safety Games

# Out-of-Order Message Delivery

٢ Observations may arrive out-of-order :




Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks


Delayed Safety Games

# Out-of-Order Message Delivery

Observations may arrive *out-of-order* :



© But this may only reduce effective delay, improving controllability :




Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

Delayed Safety Games

# Out-of-Order Message Delivery

Observations may arrive out-of-order :



But this may only reduce effective delay, improving controllability :




- W.r.t. qualitative controllability, the worst-case of out-of-order delivery is equivalent to order-preserving delay k.
- © Stochastically expected controllability even better than for strict delay *k*.

**Delayed Safety Games** 

# (Bounded) Message Loss

© Message carrying the state information may get *lost* :



The controller can still win a safety game in the presence of bounded message loss leveraging delay-resilient strategies. Motivation Formal V


Formal Verification

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

**Delayed Safety Games** 

# Equivalence of Qualitative Controllability



M. Chen, M. Fränzle, Y. Li, P. N. Mosaad, N. Zhan : Indecision and delays are the parents of failure : Taming them algorithmically by synthesizing delay-resilient control. Acta Informatica '21. Delay Hybrid Systems

# Synthesizing Safe Switching Logic for Hybrid Systems

2.1 Safety Games

Incremental Synthesis → Delay-Resilient Control Diff. Delay Patterns → Equivalent Controllability Invariance

2.2 Delay Hybrid Automata
 Fixed-Point Comput. → Invariant Generation
 Global Invariants → Safe Switching Logic

Motivation

Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

52/61

Delay Hybrid Systems

# Delay Hybrid Automata


Definition (Delay Hybrid Automaton, DHA)

A DHA is a tuple  $\mathcal{H} \cong (Q, X, U, Inv, X_0, F, E, D, G, R)$  where

- U: a set of continuous functionals,
- Inv: an invariant Inv(q) for each mode  $q \in Q$ ,

**R**: 
$$E \times X_D \rightarrow U$$
: reset functions,

...



Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

Delay Hybrid Systems

## Switching-Logic Synthesis Problem

Given : A DHA  $\mathcal{H} = (Q, X, U, Inv, X_0, F, E, D, G, R)$  and a safety property P;

Goal: A new DHA  $\mathcal{H}^{\star} = (Q, X, U^{\star}, Inv^{\star}, X_0^{\star}, F, E, D, G^{\star}, R)$  such that


- *H*<sup>\*</sup> is safe w.r.t. P,
- *H*<sup>\*</sup> is a *refinement* of *H*,
- H<sup>\*</sup> is non-blocking.

Y. Bai, T. Gan, L. Jiao, B. Xia, B. Xue, N. Zhan: Switching controller synthesis for time-delayed hybrid systems (under perturbation). HSCC '21 (Sci. China Math. '21). Delay Hybrid Systems

## Invariant Generation

Generate a global invariant for  ${\mathcal H}$  by computing a fixed point :

- generate a strengthened differential invariant for each mode,
- **2** generate a *strengthened guard* for each transition.



 Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks


Delay Hybrid Systems

## **Generating Differential Invariants**

### Linear DDE: $\dot{\mathbf{x}}(t) = A\mathbf{x}(t) + B\mathbf{x}(t - r) + C\mathbf{w}(t)$

#### **1** reduce to *T-invariant*, i.e., $\forall T > T^*$ , $\infty$ -invariant $\iff$ *T*-invariant,


**2** compute a *safe over-approximation* of the reachable set within *T*.



Motivation	Formal Verification	Controller Synthesis	Concluding Remarks
		000000000000000000000000000000000000000	
Delay Hybrid Systems			

## **Generating Differential Invariants**

- Linear DDE:  $\dot{\mathbf{x}}(t) = A\mathbf{x}(t) + B\mathbf{x}(t-r) + C\mathbf{w}(t)$
- reduce to *T-invariant*, i.e., ∀*T* > *T*\*, ∞-invariant ↔ *T*-invariant,
   compute a *safe over-approximation* of the reachable set within *T*.



Motivation	Formal Verification	Controller Synthesis
00000000000000	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	000000000000000000000000000000000000000

Concluding Remarks

Delay Hybrid Systems

# Generating Differential Invariants

Delay Hybrid Systems			
		000000000000000000000000000000000000000	
Motivation	Formal Verification	Controller Synthesis	Concluding Remarks

### **Generating Differential Invariants**

Reduce to *T-invariant*, i.e.,  $\forall T > T^*$ ,  $\infty$ -invariant  $\iff$  *T*-invariant.

#### Locally exponentially convergent to a ball:

if there exist constants  $\gamma > 0, l > 0$  and non-decreasing function  $\kappa(\cdot)$  s.t.  $\|\phi(t)\|_{\infty} \le l \Rightarrow \|\xi_{\phi}^{w}(t)\|_{\infty} \le r + \kappa(\|\phi\|_{\infty})e^{-\gamma t}, \quad \forall t \ge 0$ 

holds for all  $\phi \in C$ ,  $\|\boldsymbol{w}(t)\|_{\infty} \leq \overline{w}, \forall t \geq 0$ .

Formal Verification


Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

Delay Hybrid Systems

# **Generating Guard Conditions**

- generate guards without delay via invariants,
- **2** generate guards under delay by *backward reachable-set computation*.



Motivation

Formal Verification


Controller Synthesis

Concluding Remarks

Delay Hybrid Systems

## Example : Predator-Prey Populations

$$q_1: \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \dot{x}_1(t) = -x_1(t)(1 - \frac{x_1(t)}{100}) + 0.2d_1 + w_{11}(t) \\ \dot{x}_2(t) = -1.5x_2(t)(1 - \frac{x_2(t)}{100}) + 0.1d_2 + w_{12}(t) \\ \Xi(q_1) = [-0.2, 0.2] \times [-0.1, 0.1] \\ I(q_1) = \mathbb{R}^2. \end{array} \right. \\ q_2: \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \dot{x}_1(t) = -2.5x_1(t) + 0.2x_1(t - 0.01)(1 + x_2(t)) + w_{22}(t) \\ \dot{x}_2(t) = -2x_2(t) + 0.15x_2(t - 0.01)(1 + x_2(t)) + w_{22}(t) \\ \Xi(q_2) = [-0.2, 0.2] \times [-0.2, 0.2] \\ I(q_2) = \mathbb{R}^2. \end{array} \right. \right.$$



#### Summary

# **Concluding Remarks**

#### Problem : We face

- increasingly wide-spread use of networked distributed sensing and control,
- substantial feedback delays thus affecting hybrid control schemes,
- delays impact controllability and control performance in both the discrete and the continuous parts.

#### Status: We present

- bounded safety verification methods for delayed differential dynamics,
- extension to unbounded verification by leveraging stability criteria,
- safety games under delays and incremental algorithms for efficient control synthesis,
- delay hybrid automata and algorithms for switching-logic synthesis.

#### Future Work : We'd explore

- DDE exhibiting state-dependent and/or stochastic delay,
- invariant generation for time-delayed systems (on-going) :
  - initial attempts: [Prajna & Jadbabaie : CDC '05], [Ames et al. : ACC '19, ACC '21], [Liu et al. : SCIS '21],
  - but general invariant generation for DDEs remains challenging.





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## Lie Derivatives and Trajectory Tendency




Figure 6: An illustration of how Lie derivatives capture the tendency of trajectories in terms of a polynomial function  $B(\mathbf{x})$ .  $\zeta$ : the system trajectory passing through (-1, 1);  $\mathbf{v}$ : the evolution direction per the vector field at (-1, 1);  $\mathbf{u}$ : the gradient of  $B(\mathbf{x})$  at (-1, 1).

Theorem (Equivalence of qualitative controllability)

Given a two-player safety game, the following statements are equivalent if  $\delta$  is even :

- **There exists a winning strategy under an exact delay of**  $\delta$ , i.e., if at any point of time t the control strategy is computed based on a prefix of the game that has length  $t \delta$ .
- **2** There exists a winning strategy under time-stamped out-of-order delivery with a maximum delay of  $\delta$ , i.e., if at any point of time t the control strategy is computed based on the complete prefix of the game of length  $t \delta$  plus potentially available partial knowledge of the game states between  $t \delta$  and t.
- **There exists a winning strategy when at any time** t = 2n, *i.e., any player-0 move, information on the game state at some time*  $t' \in \{t 2k, ..., t\}$  *is available, i.e., under out-of-order delivery of messages with a maximum delay of*  $\delta$  *and a maximum number of consecutively lost upstream or downstream messages of*  $\delta/2$ *.*

The first two equivalences do also hold for odd  $\delta$ .

M. Chen, M. Fränzle, Y. Li, P. N. Mosaad, N. Zhan : Indecision and delays are the parents of failure : Taming them algorithmically by synthesizing delay-resilient control. Acta Informatica '20.